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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
IN THE MATTER OF THE REPORT
OF THE GRAND JURY; PETITIONERS H. C. SHOEMAKER,
WILLIAM A. DAWSON, PHILO T.
FARNSWORTH, D. H. WHITTENBURG, HARLEY J. CORLEISSEN,
and LAYTON MAXFIELD; and
PROVO CITY, a Municipal Corporation of the State of Utah,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,

J

Civil No.
7856

vs.
THE STATE OF UTAH, in the interest
of the GRAND JURY PRESENTMENT, otherwise referred to as the
UTAH COUNTY GRAND JURY
REPORT,
Defendants and Appellants.

BRIEF FOR PLAINTIFFS AND
RESPONDENTS
STATEMENT OF CASE
The case is accurately stated in Appellants' brief. However, we desire to supplement so~e of· the additional facts
which seem to be of importance.
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In its findings under the headings noted in Appellants' brief the jury freely indulged itself in commentin~
on the administration and operation of the institutiom
named. It also made recommendations as to fiscal, medical, inventory, telephone service and various personnel
matters. Much of this certainly appears to be harmless.
However, the grand jury did not limit itself to general
recommendations and observations-it also undertook to
criticize and condemn the administration of some of the
State institutions and law enforcement in Provo City. This
condemnation either by design or inadvertence cast strong
inference of incompetence, maladminstration and even
possible public offenses without specifically naming the individual responsible and, in most cases, without even fixing a time or place. As a result the inescapable impression
is frequently given that present administration officials are
at fault.
The jury, for example, inferred immoral sex practices
by "male employees" with "feeble-minded girls" at the
American Fork Institution, and stated that such conduct is
"reprehensible and should be condemned" (R. 25). No employee was named, and no time or place was fixed. It was
simply a general castigation of "some employees" with the
sage observation that "where there is smoke there is fire"
(R. 26).

The jury also reported that "we listened to testimony
establishing that certain types of feeble-minded patients
had been improperly housed-" and "we have heard convincing proof of punishment of feeble-minded children by
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incarcerating them in a bare room at the school-" (R. 27).
At another point in the "presentment" the jury reported
"There is evidence of maladministration at the American
Fork Training School" ( R. 23) . These comments <»1. secret
evidence or information obtained outside of the jury room
by the grand jury were not related to any specific time or
place or administration.
In referring to the Road Commission, the Jury stated
that a State Road truck had been sold by the "then District
Superintendent to his son at a price far below its real
value" (R. 39). Whether this "then District Superintendent" is the same one whose son allegedly purchased a truck
from the Road Commission as appears at another page in
the "presentment" is not clear. In any event, the "then
District Superintendent" is notnamed and no time or place
is fixed. There are also general comments relative to "highly irregular" practices. The clear inference is that the
"highly irregular" practices were done with Commission
approval and the jury concludes that while the acts were
not indictable, they were "inexcusable irregularities" and
"we strongly condemn" (R. 41).
While the "presentment" tends to praise the officials
of Utah County by stating "generally we find that County
affairs have been capably and efficiently administered by
the respective County officers * * * and we commend
them" (R. 42), it refers to unintentional law violations,
with comment that the grand jury has no authority to indict because these violations are misdemeanors (R. 43) .
On the other hand, in referring to law enforcement in
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Provo City the observation is made that "the general morale
within the Provo City Police Department seems to be at a
low ebb" (R. 48). A reference is then made to a specific
drunken driving case which the City Attorney is supposed
to have improperly reduced to reckless driving. This
specific instance was "strongly condemned" (R. 49).
The foregoing recitations of the facts "presented" by
the Grand Jury are simply stated to demonstrate the type
report made, and do not include all the objectionable matter.

POINTS RELIED ON
POINT I.
THE UTAH STATUTES DO NOT AUTHORIZE
A GRAND JURY TO MAKE A REPORT IN
WRITING.

POINT II.
rHE GREAT WEIGHT OF AUTHORITY AT
COMMON LAW DOES NOT PERMIT A GRAND
JURY TO MAKE WRITTEN REPORTS WHICH
CRITICIZE AND CONDEMN BUT FAIL TO INDICT OR MAKE A WRITTEN ACCUSATION
OF A PUBLIC OFFENSE UPON WHICH A
COMPLAINT MAY ISSUE.
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5
ARGUMENT

Introduction, definitions, and statutory provisions.
The Utah statutes do not in any way use or refer to
the word "presentment." The only use of this word appears
in the Utah Constitution, wherein it is provided:
"No person shall be held to answer for a capital,
or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases
arising in land or naval forces or in the Militia when
in actual service in time of war or public danger."
Undoubtedly the use of this word as set out in the
Constitution necessarily implies its common law meaning,
which in turn presupposes grand jury action. See Eason
v. State, 11 Ark. ( 6 England) 481, 482.
Historically, at common law a presentment was prepared by the grand jury whereas an indictment was prepared by the King's counsel. The presentment differed from
the indictment in form only. It was in fact an informal
accusation of a crime in writing addressed to the attorney
general. On this "presentment" the attorney general based
an indictment. See In re Gardiner, infra, and Words and
Phrases, volume 33, page 457 and following.
A so-called "presentment" not dealing with public offenses or crimes, but dealing generally with administrative
matters, and condemning and censuring without actually
accusing of a public offense was not tolerated at English
Common law. It is true, as indicated by Appellants in their
brief, that for a time there were isolated instances of public
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censure of constables and criticism of road conditions by
Grand Juries. However, even these isolated instances are
not applicable precedents because the limited practice was
abolished by statute. W. S. Holdsworth in Vol X of A
History of English Law, page 150 states:
"Nevertheless this modified system of presentment by high and petty constables lasted till 1827,
when it was abolished by a statute passed in that
year."
At page 151 of the same Volume he states:
"The use of the machinery of presentment to
enforce duties to repair highways was abolished in
1835."
Inasmuch as the statutes of England, insofar as they
are applicable to general common law principles became a
part of the common law, it must be concluded that as early
as 1835 presentments of the typ,e referred to by Appellants
in their brief were in fact not permitted.
The word "presentment" then, as it refers to anything
less than a crime or public offense is actually a misnomer.
Certainly, the written report of a grand jury publicly made,
dealing with administrative matters and condemning or
censuring without in fact charging a public offense is not,
properly speaking, a presentment as it was known at common law.
The question then in reality, is not whether the grand
jury is authorized to make a so-called "presentment," but
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whether or not it can make a written report, not charging
an offense, but condemning public officials generally.

POINT I.
THE UTAH STATUTES DO NOT AUTHORIZE
A GRAND JURY TO MAKE A REPORT IN
WRITING.
There are several statutes specifically dealing with a
grand jury's rights and obligations relative to its report to
the court. 105-19-1 of Utah Code Annotated 1943, provides
as follows:
"The Grand Jury must inquire into all public
offenses within the jurisdiction of the court committed or triable within the county, and present
them to the court by indictment or by an accusation
in writing."

It will be observed 'that both "indictment" and "accusation in writing" refer to "public offenses."
In 105-7-2 the legislature has further indicated what
is meant by an "accusation in writing." That statute is as
follows:
"An accusatiq_n in writing against any district,
county, precinct or municipal officer, or an officer
of any board of education, for any high crime, misdemeanor or malfeasance in office may be presented
to the district court by the Grand Jury or by the
district attorney or by the county attorney of the
county in which the officer accused was .elected or
appointed.
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The next section, 105-7-3, provides:
"The accusation must state the offense charged
in ordinary and concise language."
The statutes then provide that the accusation in writing be presented by the foreman to the court and filed with
the clerk (105-7-4). The next section provides for the appearance of the defendant to answer the charge (105-7-5).
Thus the statutes in our state provide for indictment
or written accusation charging either a crime or a malfeasance for which removal wUllie.
Other Utah statutes relating to the question are as follows:
105-19-3:
"In the investigation of a charge for the purpose of indictment the Grand Jury must receive no
other evidence than such as shall be given by witnesses produced and sworn before them. * * *
The Grand Jury must receive none but legal evidence
and the best evidence and degree to the exclusion of
hearsay or secondary evidence."
Section 105-19-5 provides:
"The Grand Jury ought to find an indictment
when all the evidence before them taken together if
unexplained or uncontradicted would, in their judgment, warrant a conviction by a trial jury."
Section 105-19-7 specifically directs the grand jury to
inquire into the case of * * *
"every person imprisoned in jails of the county on
a criminal charge and not indicted or informed
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against, into the conditions and management of the
public prisons within the county; and into the wilfuU and corrupt misconduct in office of public officers of every description within the county."
105-19-7 has a historical background. Inspection of the
jails was made a specific duty to correct two possible
abuses: 1. Holding prisoners without bail or charge, and,
2, detecting cruel and inhuman punishments.
The provision relating to wilful and corrupt misconduct
in office of public officers of course relates to either a
specific public offense or a malfeasance in office. · Malfeasance in office is, by definition, wilful and corrupt. (So
held in Attwood v. Cox, 88 Utah 437, 55 Pac. 2d 377.)
Thus in Bryant v. Crossland, 206 S. W. 791, 182 Ky.
556, the Kentucky Supreme Court said that misfeasance and
malfeasance in office are public offenses. Misfeasance and
Malfeasance in office, while not specifically defined by our
statutes, are considered public offenses. Thus in 105-7-2,
supra, the grand jury is specifically empowered to make an
accusation in writing relative to malfeasance in office.
What is a public offense? Of course, it is not that which
a grand jury or any other group believes is censurable. It is
that which the law. has made a crime or one for which
removal will lie. Thus in West v. Territory, Arizona, 36 P.
207, 4 Ariz. 212, the Arizona Supreme Court said that the
term "public offense" has the same meaning as "crime."
In Oleson v. Pincock, 251 P. 23, 68 Utah 507, the Utah
Supreme Court held that "public offense," as used in Compiled Laws of 1917, Section 8714, authorizing arrest without
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warrant for public offenses committed in an officer's presence, includes every such offense constituting misdemeanors
and not merely breaches of the peace, for which an arrest
can be made in the officer's presence under common law.
It must, therefore, be concluded that the Utah statutes
do not authorize a grand jury to do more than indict or
make a written accusation, charging a specific puolic offense involving wilful and corrupt misconduct.

POINT II.
THE GREAT WEIGHT OF AUTHORITY AT
COMMON LAW DOES NOT PERMIT A GRAND
JURY TO 1\iAKE WRITTEN REPORTS WHICH
CRITICIZE AND CONDEMN BUT FAIL TO INDICT OR MAKE A WRITTEN ACCUSATION
OF A PUBLIC OFFENSE UPON WHICH A
COMPLAINT MAY ISSUE.
Clearly, the English common law did not provide for
written reports to be made by the grand jury. Furthermore, a "presentment" was never a written report commenting on matters generally. It was a written accusation addressed to the prosecuting attorney charging a crime. See
supra. Of course, under a practice which permits and
authorizes the prosecuting attorney to sit with the grand
jury, there is no need for the jury to address written
communications to him, as there was under the old English
common law system. The grand jury now consults with the
District Attorney and frames an indictment in the first
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instance. It would seem, therefore, that the necessary conclusion which must be reached is that at English common
law written reports commenting generally on administrative matters and censuring and condemning public officers
without charging a specific public offense were unknown.
Furthermore, a "presentment" was not a written report.
It was a written accusation charging a crime upon which
an indictment could be based. Therefore, so far as the English common law is concerned, the use of the word "presentment" to identify a written report on general conditions,
is a complete misnomer.
88-2-1 of the Utah Code provides as follows:
"The common law of England insofa'r as it is
not repugnant to, or in conflict with, the Constitution or laws of the United States, or the Constitution or laws of this State, and so far only as it is
consistent with and adapted to the natural and physical conditions of this State and the necessities of
the people thereof, is hereby adopted, and shall be
the rule of decision of all courts of this State."
If this statute be construed as adopting the English
common law as distinguished from common law generally
as it existed in 1896, it must of course be concluded that
there is neither statutory nor common law authority for
a written report identified as a "presentment" or otherwise
which does not charge a public offense upon which a complaint or an indictment may be laid.

7

The cases in New York are discussed herein at some
length because of the development in the law which has
taken place before that court. Originally the New York
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courts held that a motion to expunge the report of a grand
jury which criticized and condemned individuals without
charging a public offense upon which an indictment could
be based would be denied on the grounds that a grand jury
had authority to make such a report because of its broad
inquisitorial powers. The first case of importance so holding was In re Jones, 92 N. Y. Supp. 275., It has frequently
been quoted as a landmark case and Respondents believe
has erroneously been relied upon~ In that case the grand
jury made a report criticizing the actions of the clerk of a
Board of Supervisors of Nassau County. This clerk made
a motion to set aside and quash the "presentment," which
motion was denied. The Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, in January, 1905, affirmed the action of
the lower court with one justice dissenting. In the majority
opinion, the court said :
"I think, therefore, that any final finding upon
the exercise of these inquisitorial powers may be
called a presentment, and that it may be regarded
as final, and not improper, because an indictment
cannot or does not follow it. While it is true that
the Code of Criminal Procedure does not in terms
provide for a report as the result of this inquiry nor
directly provide for a presentment, yet it is significant that the term is used in contradistinction to an
indictment in section 250, which reads as follows:
"'The grand jury must appoint one of their
number as clerk, who is to preserve minutes of
their proceedings (except of the votes of the
individual members on a presentment or indictment), and of the evidence given before them.'
""* * * but, while a report or presentment
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of a grand jury neither calls upon a person nor
suffers him to answer, it may be that the court in
its inherent power might, on the application of one
aggrieved, refer or resubmit the matter to the further inquiry of the grand jury, or of a grand jury,
in order that justice be done after a full hearing.
I think that if under the guise of a presentment, the
grand jury simply accuse, thereby compelling the
accused to stand mute, where the presentment would
warrant indictment so that the accused might answer, the presentment may be expunged; but I do
not think that a presentment as a report upon the
exercise of inquisitorial powers must be stricken out
if it incidentally points out that this or that public
official is responsible for omissions or commissions,
negligence or defects."
Justice Woodward, who was the dissenting Justice,
disapproved of the majority ruling and commented at some
length on the common law background and his reasons for
holding that such a report was not authorized and should
be expunged on proper motion. (His dissenting opinion is
herein quoted at some length because it is Respondents'
opinion that this opinion more nearly represents what the
law has become in New York State, and that it has been
frequently quoted in the cases which represent the great
weight of authority in this country) At page 278 he states:

"* * * In determining the powers of the
grand jury under the laws of this state, whether
regulated by statute or usage constituting the common law, we have a right to consider what that body
might do under this indefinite power of making
presentments if that power be conceded. If it has
the right to censure the petitioners in the matter
now before us, it is difficult to conceive of any limiSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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tation upon the powers of the grand jury. It may
establish its own standards of right and wrong, and
may subject the citizen to the odium of a judicial
condemnation without giving him the slightest opportunity to be heard; oftentimes working, in the
public estimate, as great an injury to his standing
and character as though he had in fact been accused
of a crime. This is a perversion of the essential
spirit of the grand jury system, which had for its
object the protection of the citizen against an open
and public accusation of crime, and from the trouble,
expense, and anxiety of a public trial, before a probable cause is established by the presentment and indictment. Jones v. Robbins, 8 Gray, 329, 344. It
cannot be that it was ever contemplated that this
body, created for the protection of the citizen, was
to have the power to set up its own standards of
public or private morals, and to arraign citizens at
the bar of public opinion, without responsibility for
its abuse of that power, and without giving to the
citizen the right to a trial upon the accusations. , _
/*

I

*

*

*

*'·,)

.

"There 'are two great purposes-one to bring to
trial those who are properly charged with crime, the
other to protect the citizen against unfounded accusation of crime. When the grand jury goes beyond
this, and attempts to set up its own standards, and
to administer punishment in the way of public. censure, it is defeating the very purposes it was intended to conserve; and its action cannot, therefore,
be lawful. Section 6 of article 1 of the state Constitution provides that 'no person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime
* * * unless on presentment or indictment of a
grand jury, and in any trial in any court whatever
the party accused shall be allowed to appear and
defend in person and with counsel as in civil actions.'
*. * * -In other words, a 'presentment on indictSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ment,' as applied to the citizen by our Constitution,
contemplates, in substance, the same thing. It contemplates an accusation of crime, to be followed by
an answer on the part of the person thus formally
accused, with an opportunity to be heard in his own
defense before a jury of his peers. The terms are,
in their relation to the individual, synonymous. No
one would contend that a citizen could be indicted for
anything less than a crime, or that, if indicted, he
could be denied an opporunity to answer and to appear in his own defense before a iury; and it seems
to be equally clear that there is no constitutional
right to make a presentment against an individual
in a case where an indictment would not lie. The
rights of the citizen are the same under either an indictment or a presentment. There is the right to
answer and to appear in person and by counsel, and
to have a trial by jury in any case in which an indictment might properly be made . .'An indictment
is an accusation in writing, presented by a grand
iury to a competent court, charging a person with a
crime.' * * *"
At page 280 the dissenting Justice said :

"* * * If there has been no crime or offense,
the grand jury, designed for the protection of the
citizen, has no right to create an offense unknown to
the law for the purpose of administering punishment
by way of censure, for this a 'government of laws,
not of men,' to quote the preamble of the Constitution of Massachusetts and the language of Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch, 163,
2 L. Ed. 60. The rule is not different because the
accusation takes the form of a presentment rather
than of an indictment, which as I have already suggested, are synonymous terms as used in our iurisprudence, and particularly so since the adoption of
our Code of Criminal Procedure * * * If the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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acts charged do not constitute a crime, then there
is no indictment before the court, and the petitioners
clearly have a right to be relieved of the odium of a
judicial censure, where the document in which such
censure is contained is a mere impertinence, without
authority of law. * * *"

/

l

In an earlier New York case, In re Gardiner, decided
in 1900, and cited in 31 Misc. 364, 64 N. Y. Supp. 760, the
grand jury made a "presentment" criticizing the District
Attorney. The District Attorney made a motion to set aside
or quash. The court, in granting the motion, said:
"Sometimes, however, our grand juries make a
sort of general presentment of evil and evil things
to call public attention to them, yet not an instruction
for any specific indictment. No one could be called
to answer to such a presentment. * * * While
it may be observed that the court had tolerated rather
than sanctioned such presentments of things general,
yet the grand jury should never, under cover of a
presentment, present an individual in this manner;
for if it have legal evidence of the commission of a
crime, it should find an indictment against him upon
which he could be held to answer, and if it have no
such evidence, it ought, in fairness, to be silent. The
powers of the grand jury extend only to questions of
crime. Its functions are not executive, but judicial.
It is in fact a preliminary tribunal, and it is furnished with inquisitorial powers only for the purpose)
of examining into crimes."
The next case of importance after the Jones case was
Re Osborne, 68 Misc. 597, 125 N. Y. Supp. 313, decided in
1910. In that case the grand jury had filed a report reflecting upon the professional integrity of the prosecuting
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attorney. He had made a motion to strike from the record.
The court in sustaining his motion said :
"It has become a custom of almost invariable'
occurrence that the grand jury, at the close of its
term, makes a presentment on some subject on which,
frequently, no evidence has been heard. This, no
doubt, proceeds from the zeal of its members to promote the general welfare by calling attention to certain conditions which they believe should be remedied. So long as they are confined to matters of
general interest they are regarded as harmless, even
though a waste of time and effort, and after the
ephemeral notice of the day has passed they are allowed a peaceful rest. But it is very different when
the motives and conduct of the individual are impugned, and he held to reprobation, without an opportunity to defend or protect his name and reputation, for it must be borne in mind that if the gentlemen of the grand jury were to meet as an association
of individuals and give expression to the sentiments
contained in a presentment, little attention would be
paid to them, and a healthy regard for the responsibility of utterances injurious to the individual would,
in all probability, restrain exaggerated and unfounded statements. The mischief arises from a prevalent belief that a grand jury making the conventional presentment speaks with great authority, and
acts under the sanction of the court, thereby giving
to its deliverance a solemnity which impresses the
mind of the public. This is a grave error. The powers and duties of a grand jury are defined by law.
No matter how respectable or eminent citizens may
be who comprise the grand jury, they are not above
the law, and the people have not delegated to them
arbitrary or plenary powers to do that, under an
ancient form, which they have not a legal right to do."
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The court in the Osborne case, supra, referred to the
Jones case, supra, and after discussing the majority opinion
remarked that the dissenting opinion of Justice Woodward
was founded on better reason and then ordered that the
paper entitled a "presentment" be stricken and expunged
from the Tecords. The court in the Osborne case thus repudiated the majority opinion in the Jones case and adopted
the dissenting opinion of Justice Woodward.(
\
Iq

o~

In re Hafernan, 125 N.Y. S~pp. 737,1'he grand j~ry had
made a presentment charging certain borough officials with
neglect of their duties and of the public interest. A motion
was made to set aside and expunge this from the record on
the ground that it was "inadvisedly made by the grand jury
in excess of its powers." The court in granting the motion
said:

"* * * They are not part of the administrative government of a great municipality. They have
the fullest and amplest power to investigate, as it is
their solemn and prescribed duty to do, into 'the
wilful and corrupt misconduct in office, of public
officers of every description, in the county.' Finding
any such evidence of wilful and corrupt misconduct,
it would be their clear duty to indict. Then the official could have his day in court, where he would
receive either the condemnation which he deserved
if his actions have been unlawful, or the vindication
that he would desire in case he was blameless. From
a grand jury, obviously nothing but the fairest consideration of any questions submitted to them is expected. The Star Chamber of the olden days no
longer exists, and any action on the part of a grand
jury which would partake of the character of the
proceedings of that anci~nt and abhorred system
would not be tolerated today."
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To the same effect see Re Crosby (1925) 126 Misc.
250, 213 N.Y. S. 86, Re Funston (1929) 133 Misc. 620, 233
N.Y. S. 81, People v. McCabe (1933) 148 Misc. 330, 266
N.Y. S. 363, andRe Wilcox (1934) 153 Misc. 761, 276 N.
Y. S. 117. In all these cases the court expunged from the
record a so-called "presentment".
In the Crosby case, supra, the court expunged from the
records a grand jury report which lauded the high character of certain officials but at the same time criticized them
for the prevalence of gambling and houses of prostitution.
The presentment apparently also contained numerous philosophical observances.
In the Funston case, supra, the court indicated that a
"presentment" could not be used by the grand jury to attack
the name of a citizen or to charge a public official with
misconduct without giving him a chance to be heard. The
court, therefore, expunged the presentment.
In the McCabe case, supra, the court, in expunging the
"presentment" from the record· said :

"A presentment is a foul blow. It wins the importance of a judicial document; yet it lacks its
principal attributes-the right to answer and to appeal. It accuses, but furnishes no forum for a denial.
No one knows upon what evidence the findings are
based. An indictment may be challenged-even defeated. The presentment is immune. It is like the
'hit and run' motorist. Before application can be
made to suppress it, it is the subject of public gossip.
The damage is done. The injury it may unjustly inflict may never be healed."
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In the Wilcox case, supra, the presentment charged
gross irregularities on the part of certain election inspectors. This was ordered expunged on petition of one of the
inspectors involved.
In the Healey case, 293 N.Y. S. 584, a New York Court
by dicta indicated that because of New York statutes and
broad inquisitorial powers of grand juries in that jurisdiction could make a written report criticizing public officials
but not private individuals. The motion to expunge was
granted and the court indulged in strong language criticizing a "presentment" which referred to the private individual. The writer is at a loss to understand the distinction
drawn by the dicta used. In any event the N. Y. statutes
apparently do not provide for removal proceedings for
conduct of public officials who are guilty of wilfull and
corrupt misconduct. In Utah the statutes so provide so that
even the New York dicta is not applicable.
The Jones case, supra, went to the New York Supreme
Court, which court refused to review because it claimed
lack of jurisdiction.
Thus in New York the numerical majority of the courts
follow the dissenting opinion in the Jones case, and one
court, perhaps two, by dicta, follow the majority opinion.
It therefore, of course, must be concluded that there is no
settled law in New York, and any decision relied upon from
that jurisdiction is unreliable, and certainly is not the law,
even in that state.
There is a California case .which seems to collaterally
hold, at least by way of ·dicta, that the grand jury has a
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right to make a so-called "presentment". That case is Irwin
v. Murphy, 129 Cal. App. 657, 19 P. (2d) 292. This case was
an action for libel based upon the report of a grand jury investigating the death of a professional boxer. The report
criticized the boxing officials, referees and promoters. One
of the offended parties brought an action for libel and
slander. The court sustained a demurrer to the complaint
on the ground that the publication of the grand jury was
privileged. This was the only question which was directly
before the court.
The California case, supra, and one or two of the New
York cases which seem to follow the majority opinion in
the Jones case, supra apparently make up Appellants' case
authorities. The Jones case is not controlling New York
law, and the other cases involve collateral matters and therefore rulings which did not arise out of direct attacks. On
the other hand, all the other cases which counsel can find,
and which arise out of direct attacks, as in the instant case,
have squarely ruled that the grand jury may not make
written reports which do not charge a public offense.
In Ex parte Robinson decided in January, 1936, 165
So. 582, 231 Ala. 503, the Alabama Supreme Court had before it this same question. There the grand jury had criticized the conduct of the City Commissioner but had returned no indictment. The Commission had moved the Circuit Court to expunge from its records the grand jury's report. The Alabama Circuit Court reviewed the cases and
indicated that there was no question but that the Circuit
Court had the power to expunge the report and that it
should have done so. It therefore issued a writ of manSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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damus ordering the court to do so. The Alabama court
referred to the California case of Irwin v. Murphy, supra,
and said:
"* * * That opinion also justifies grand
juries in making such reports. That is the only case
we have seen which does so (not subsequently overruled), but the question was collateral, as in our
Parsons Case, supra, which does not, as we have
shown, go the extent of saying that the grand jury
has that legal right."
The court then went on to comment on the great weight
of authority and said:
"On the other hand, where the question has
arisen on direct attack, as here, with one accord, the
cases hold that the officer when he is thus criticized
has the right in such a proceeding as this to have the
report expunged. In one case it is thus expressed:
'While it may be observed that the court has tolerated, rather than sanctioned, such presentments of
things general, yet the grand jury should never, under cover of a presentment, present an individual in
this manner for, if it have legal evidence of the commission of the crime, it should find an in.dictment
against him upon which he could be held to answer,
and, if it have no such evidence, it ought, in fairness,
to be silent.' * * *" (Italics added.)
One of the cases most often quoted on the proposition
that a grand jury has no right to make a "presentment" is
the case of Bennett v. Kalamazoo Circuit Judge, decided .
in Michigan in 1914, 182 Mich. 200, 150 N. W. 141. In that
case the grand jury made a written report to the Circuit
Court in which they criticized the conduct of the prosecuting attorney. They did not return an indictment against
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him. He requested the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to compel the Circuit Judge to strike from the files
of the court the grand jury's report. The court granted the
writ of mandamus and said :
"A review of all the cases cited upon both sides
of the question, and such others as we have been
able to examine, leads 'US to the conclusion that inherently, apart from statutory sanction, the grand
jury has no right to file such a report, unless it is
followed by an indictment. The evils of the contrary
practice must be apparent to all. While the proceedings of the grand jury are supposed to be secret, it
is clear that in the present instance that secrecy was
not inviolate, for the objectionable report found its
way into the press of Kalamazoo within a few hours
after it had been filed. Whether the matter contained in such report be true or false, it can make
no difference with the principle involved. In either
event the accused person is obliged to submit to the
odium of a charge or charges based, perhaps, upon
insufficient evidence, or no evidence at all, without
having the opportunity to meet his accusers and reply
to their attacks. This situation is one which offends
every one'·s sense of fair play and is surely not conducive to the decent administration of justice. Upon
the coming in of said report, we are of the opinion,
that it was the duty of the trial court to have refused
to accept it, or file it with the records of his court.
Having received and filed it, upon the application of
the petitioner, it was plainly his duty to have expunged it from the files. The writ will issue as
prayed." (Italics added.)
In Re Report of Grand Jury of Baltimore City, decided by the Court of Appeals of Maryland in 1927, 152
Mary. 616, 137 A. 370, the grand jury made a final report
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to the court containing the criticism of the methods of construction and the material used in the Clifton Park High
School. It also alleged lack of proper supervision in the construction and made recommendations as to how such work
should be done in the future. Some of those offended by the
order made a motion to expunge the report from the record.
The lower court refused to grant the motion and on appeal
the Court of Appeals of Maryland reviewed many of the
cases, citing with approval those cases holding that a grand
jury has no right to make a "presentment" which does not
constitute, for practical purposes, an indictment. The court
also pointed out that a "presentment" and an indictment as
defined at common law were practically the same thing except that a "presentment" was an informal charge made by
the grand jury to the prosecuting attorney upon which presentment the prosecuting attorney could base an indictment
and that the use of the word "presentment" to identify a
written report of a grand jury which does not charge in
indictable offense is in fact a misnomer. The court said :
"The report in the present case does not charge
any violation of law, but is a censure of the conduct
of persons engaged in the public business, inpugning
their integrity and fairness and pointing them out
as public servants whose official acts should merit
condemnation at the hands of the people. The function of the grand jury is to investigate violations of
the criminal law, and in performing this function
their inquisitorial powers are unlimited. If, however, having exercised these powers in any given
case, there is lacking sufficient evidence to indict,
their duty in that particular case ceases, and, under
their oath, nothing transpiring within their body
should be made public. It is apparent that this should
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be so, for the protection of the good name and reputation of the people, otherwise a condition would
exist which the establishment and zealous maintenance of the grand jury was intended to prevent;
namely, that of having an individual publicly charged
with misconduct without probable cause. If there
is sufficient evidence of the commission of a crime,
it is the duty of the grand jury to indict, that is,
to take such action as will bring the party to trial ;
if there is not, the citizens are and should go protected against accusations by that body which do not
mount up to a criminal offense."
In State v. Bramlett, decided in 1932 by the Supreme
Court of South Carolina, 166 S. C. 323, 164 S. E. 873, the
grand jury made a report which they called a "presentment"
in which they cited alleged misconduct of the sheriff. He
made a motion to strike on the grounds that the grand jury
had no authority to make such a "presentment". The Supreme Court of South Carolina clearly held that a grand
jury had no authority to make such so-called "presentments"-that the only presentment they could make ·was
one stating a public offense upon which an indictment could
be drawn.
"But a grand jury transcends its powers and
exceeds its duty when in its presentment it expresses
its opinion of the force and effect of the evidence
which it has heard, ex parte, or has itself collected
in its investigations, or when it discusses that evidence, andjor, when it presents an officer or person
by name, and with words of censure and reprobation,
without presenting him for indictment, or without
finding a true bill against him on a bill of indictment
in its hands. Even then it should be careful to
refrain from any expression of opinion of the guilt
of the person, or any words of condemnation. The
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reason for this rule of law is obvious.
added.)

*

*

*

*

(Italics

*

"These rights and guaranties would be denied
him if the grand jury in its presentment to the court
could prejudge the question of his guilt or innocence
by the expression or suggestion of the strength of
the evidence which its investigation has disclosed.
Its province is to present the person for the definite
crime to which it thinks the evidence points, with
the names of the witnesses, andjor the documentary
evidence in proof of the charge. If the grand jurors
are acting on an indictment already given them,
their return of 'True Bill' or 'No Bill' expresses their
prima facie reaction to the ex parte evidence. Beyond this they have no right nor power to go."
In Re Grand Jury Report decided by the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin in 1931, 204 Wis. 409, 235 N. W. 789,
the grand jury made a report in which it criticized the
conduct of a certain individual without returning an indictment against him. This individual made an application
to expunge and strike the report from the record which
motion the lower court denied. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin, on appeal reversed the case and directed the lower
court to expunge the report from the files. The court, in
making its decision, said :
"The controlling issue involved in this appeal is
whether or not the grand jurors had the right to
file the report in question with the court. The petitioner urges that the report should have been stricken
out in its entirety or at least those portions thereof
which he claims refer to him, the portions being
specifically set out in the petition which he filed.
This raises the question as to whether or not a grand
jury has legal authority to file a report other than
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the report of progress and the returning of indictments. It is a fact that at various times courts have
accepted such reports made by grand juries, and this
seems to have been done upon the theory presented
and very ably discussed by the learned trial court
in his opinion at the time of his decision upon petitioner's application. At times these reports have gone
unchallenged. At other times they have been challenged, and requests have been made to strike them
from the files. When an issue has been joined, the
rulings of courts of last resort in the vast majority
of instances have been to the effect that a grand jury
has no authority to make a report criticizing individuals either by name or by inference, and that the
grand jury's powers and authority are limited to
those conferred upon it by law." (Italics added.)
The court then cited with approval the many other
cases holding that a grand jury has no right to make written reports criticizing the conduct of individuals without
in fact returning a true bill or indictment against such individuals.
The appellant has cited as authority a Florida case, In
Re Report of Grand Jury, 152 Fla. 154, 11 So. (2nd) 316.
In this case the jury addressed a written report to the Governor urging the removal of a public officer for his misconduct in office. The majority of the Florida Supreme
Court would not grant a motion to expunge and said :

"* * * Their investigation must be directed
to detecting unlawful offenses; they will not be permitted to become the tool of blocs and groups to pry
into personal affairs or to oppress some one. Neither
will they be permitted to speak of the general qualification or moral fitness of one to hold an office or
position but whether or not a county office is being
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conducted according to law and good morals is at all
times within the jurisdiction of the grand jury to
investigate. When they find that the law has been
violated, it is their duty to indict but when they. find
charges made to be without foundation, it is as much
their duty to exonerate as it is to indict in the first
instance. * * *" (Italics added.)
Two of the judges dissented from even this limited
"presentment" on the grounds that the grand jury had no
authority but to indict and said:
"It appears to be the theory, upon which all the
cases hereinbefore referred to were decided, that it
· is beyond the province of a grand jury to present an
officer or other person by name and with words of
censure and reprobation without presenting him for
indictment, because to do so is to besmirch and hold
to reprobation the accused without opportunity to
defend or protect his name and reputation."
This case is at most authority for the proposition that
a written report may be made charging misconduct in office upon which a removal may be based. Two of the justices dissented to even this limited right to present.
The right of a grand jury to make "presentments"
which do not charge a public offense but simply censure, is
discussed in three American Law Report Annotations: 22
A. L. R. 1366, 106 A. L. R. 1388, 120 A. L. R. 437. In 106
A. L. R. 1388 the commentator states the general rule as
follows:
"A person censured, criticized, or ridiculed in a·
report by a grand jury, or of a committee appointed
by it, may have the report expunged from the offi-
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cial records where it does not amount to an indictment or presentment. * * *"
In commenting on this quotation it is important to
point out that the word "presentment" is used in its common law sense, that is, a written charge by the grand jury
to the prosecuting attorney, charging a public offense, and
not a written report censuring public officials for matters
which do not constitute public offenses or do not constitute
actions upon which a removal proceeding may be based.
· The general rule is also stated in Volume 24, American
Jurisprudence, at page 859, as follows :
"A presentment is distinguished from an indictment in that the former is an informal accusation,
made by the grand jury on its own knowledge, to be
used by the prosecutor as the basis for a true bill
or indictment. In its stricter meaning, a presentment
has· been said to be an accusation by the grand jury
sua sponte, made ex mero motu, whereas an indictment is a written accusation, preferred to the grand
jury and presented upon oath at the instance of the
government. Although presentments or reports may
be returned in those cases authorized by statute, it
appears that the practice has largely fallen into disuse in this country; and in the absence of statute, \
a grand jury has no right to file a report reflecting
on the character of conduct of public officers or citizens, unless it is followed by an indictment. It is the
right of a person censured or criticized by a report
of the grand jury to have it expunged from the official records. A libel may be predicated on a report
not amounting to an indictment or presentment, since
such report, being extrajudicial, is not privileged,
although there is some authority that a report filed
in good faith is not actionable without proof of ·
malice. * * *"
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The Indiana Supreme Court has held with the courts
herein relied on. See Coons v. State, 191 Indiana 580, 134
N. E. 194, wherein a report charging a judge with bias
and with favoring criminals and calling for his resignation
was held unauthorized.
CONCLUSION
From the historical and statutory viewpoint it must
be concluded that, with the exception of the Jones case and
the one or two New York cases that indirectly seem to
follow the majority opinion of that decision, and with the
exception of the Irwin and New Jersey case, which were
actions for libel, there is no authority which will support
a grand jury report which holds up for ridicule and public
censure individuals and public officials without giving them
a right to defend. On the other hand, all other authorities
in many jurisdictions where the question has arisen, directly, have repudiated this unfair practice and have
granted motions to expunge or quash or strike the report
so made.
We therefore respectfully submit that this Court should
affirm the decision of the lower court.
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